methodology

How do we determine a level of undermining effect on democracy? This is an issue open for a discussion and we actually hope that our publications will provoke debates on this topic. Right now for each individual profile we use the methodology below which allows us to determine whether a person under review is involved in any of the following:

LOW

·        Avoids proper taxation in home country through offshore jurisdictions

·        Publicly supports in business and political fora anti-Western sanctions and repressive legislation (anti-LGBTQ and against rights of women and minorities in byzantine manner)

·        Actively promotes other state propaganda expedient for kleptocratic goals

MODERATE

·        Publicly “normalizes” annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine and Georgia and other instances of major departure from international agreements and laws

·        Has been reported by responsible sources to participate in trans-border money laundering activity under $1mn

SIGNIFICANT

·        Regularly appears on anti-democratic media and/or helps with propaganda messages through any media

·        Has been reported by responsible sources to participate in trans-border money laundering activity over $1mn

·        Is an ordinary (“sleeping”) member of Russia’s presidential group “trusted representatives” or an analogous program in other kleptocracies.  

HIGH

·        Has access to luxury or visible assets abroad (real estate, sports clubs and stadiums or bigger than 1% of the local GDP) that can’t be clearly explained by fair business

·        Uses offshore or special zones and/or anonymous accounts for financial flows that benefit key representatives of kleptocratic regimes

·        Contracted (or co-opted otherwise) top law and PR firm figures in ways useful to kleptocracies

·        Provides grants or other participation or joint activity with top local academic institutions in non-political or non-business sphere like art, history, sciences, etc. for purposes of reputation-laundering, questionable access to policy-makers or otherwise useful to kleptocracies

·        Has been reported by responsible sources to participate in trans-border money laundering activity over $10mn

·        Is an active member of Russia’s presidential group “trusted representatives” or an analogous program in other kleptocracies, travelling abroad and promoting support to authoritarian rule.

·        Acts a spoiler or fake candidate during elections with the support of the regime in order to boost the main candidate and/or destroy trust in meaningfulness of elections and/or normalize non-democratic rigged electoral process in the West.

·        Has been mentioned by Western law enforcement or courts as engaged with kleptocracy

IMMENSE

·        Has access to strategic assets abroad (mineral extraction, telecoms, IT, media or bigger than 3% of the local GDP) that can’t be clearly explained by fair business

·        Contracted or co-opted local dignitaries, politicians, celebrities or audit/due diligence entities for reputation laundering or other goals useful to kleptocracies

·        Influences local political discourse through donations, media acquisition, paid content or ads

·        Delivers significant material support or publicity to Far Right or other extremist/populist movements in the West

·        Provides grants or engages in joint activity with local academic institutions in political, business or governance sphere for purposes of reputation-laundering, questionable access to policy-makers or otherwise useful to kleptocracies

·        Has been reported by responsible sources to participate in trans-border money laundering activity over $100mn

·        Has been reported on his or her attempts to subvert in any way Western law enforcement, due diligence or other legal or governance processes

This methodology will updated accordingly as we progress with our research, any suggestions for improvement are welcome through Contacts